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Abstract
Though there are surprisingly few estimates of the economic beneﬁts of coordinated
infrastructure development and operations in international river basins, there is a widespread
belief that improved cooperation is beneﬁcial for managing water scarcity and variability.
Hydro-economic optimization models are commonly-used for identifying efﬁcient allocation of
water across time and space, but such models typically assume full coordination. In the real
world, investment and operational decisions for speciﬁc projects are often made without full
consideration of potential downstream impacts. This paper describes a tractable methodology for
evaluating the economic beneﬁts of infrastructure coordination. We demonstrate its application
over a range of water availability scenarios in a catchment of the Mekong located in Lao PDR,
the Nam Ngum River Basin. Results from this basin suggest that coordination improves system
net beneﬁts from irrigation and hydropower by approximately 3–12% (or US$12-53 million/yr)
assuming moderate levels of ﬂood control, and that the magnitude of coordination beneﬁts
generally increases with the level of water availability and with inﬂow variability. Similar
analyses would be useful for developing a systematic understanding of the factors that increase
the costs of non-cooperation in river basin systems worldwide, and would likely help to improve
targeting of efforts to stimulate complicated negotiations over water resources.
S Online supplementary data available from stacks.iop.org/ERL/9/105006/mmedia
Keywords: hydroeconomic models, water resources planning and management, cooperation,
reservoir coordination, irrigation, hydropower, Mekong
1. Introduction
With increasing global water scarcity and the reality of cli-
mate change disruptions to hydrological systems, there is
growing international recognition of the importance of
cooperation for effective water resources management. Part of
the focus on improving cooperation stems from concerns over
potential future water-related conﬂicts (Homer-Dixon 1994),
though research indicates that violent conﬂict over this
resource has historically been rare (Wolf 1998). A somewhat
different argument is that cooperation of planning and
operation of water-related infrastructure can produce gains in
economic efﬁciency (Howe et al 1986, Rogers et al 2002,
Sadoff and Grey 2002). The emergence of concepts based on
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) and beneﬁt-
sharing, as well as norms for water sharing in international
law, reﬂect this trend (GWP 2000). In discussions about
cooperative management of water resources, water infra-
structures, and dams in particular, often receive considerable
attention. Such projects often generate multipurpose beneﬁts
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and are crucial for providing ﬂexibility for coping with
variability, but are typically designed in order to maximize
speciﬁc objectives, for example revenues from energy gen-
eration (Tilmant et al 2010). Indeed, the traditional design
paradigm for dams is often heavily critiqued for not ade-
quately considering spillovers to other economic sectors,
downstream agents, or ecosystems (both positive and nega-
tive), even when these are acknowledged in planning docu-
ments (WCD 2000, Labadie 2004, Davis 2007).
Despite the prominence of the view that cooperation in
water resources management is desirable, unilateral water
resources development that ignores the ‘system value of
water’—or aggregate value across all uses in a watershed—
remains the norm in most basins (Sadoff and Whittington 2002,
Whittington et al 2013). In the absence of formal agreements
between riparians sharing water resources, there is a short-term
incentive to pre-emptively lay claim to unused water resources
by pursuing projects that are perhaps sub-optimal in the long
term (Wu and Whittington 2006). In addition, there is
remarkably little quantitative analysis and understanding of the
economic value and distribution of gains from cooperation—as
we discuss further in this paper. There may also be problems
with placing undue emphasis on the value of coordination, if
for example overestimation of interdependence across users
rationalizes the anxiety and fear of downstream riparians
regarding the effects of proposed large upstream infrastructures,
thereby impeding development (Wu et al 2013). Also com-
plicating discussions over water are transaction costs; the spa-
tio-temporal complexity and variability of the resource, both of
which are increasing with climate change; the fact that devel-
opment planning affecting water resources is often undertaken
outside the water sector; and political obstacles to cooperation
(Elhance 2000, Wu and Whittington 2006).
Whatever the reason for these coordination failures, a
better understanding of the beneﬁts of cooperation relative to
unilateral infrastructure development and management
appears critical to negotiating and achieving more efﬁcient
outcomes. This paper outlines and demonstrates an approach
for considering these beneﬁts. Section 2 presents a basic
framework for assessing the costs of non-coordination in river
basins with multiple users, and considers the nature of past
efforts to measure such costs (or alternatively, to estimate the
value of cooperation). In section 3, we present an application
that focuses on the Nam Ngum Basin, a sub-catchment of the
Mekong located in the People’s Democratic Republic of Lao
(hereafter Lao PDR). The paper ends with consideration of
the broader implications of this application, and a discussion
of research questions and challenges related to evaluation of
the costs of non-cooperation.
2. Using hydro-economic modeling to consider the
costs of non-cooperation in river basins
2.1. Hydro-economic framework
This section describes a hydro-economic approach for esti-
mating the costs of non-cooperation in water resource
systems, or conversely, the net economic beneﬁts of inte-
grated management of water resources at the basin-scale.
Hydro-economic models are node-link conceptualizations of
speciﬁc water resource systems that include water balance
components (e.g. river ﬂows, evaporation and outﬂows from
surface water bodies, natural groundwater recharge and dis-
charge, and return ﬂows), and built water control structures
(canals, reservoirs, treatment plants, pumping stations, etc)
(Maass et al 1962). In contrast to engineering models that
minimize costs or maximize particular outputs (e.g. water
availability for irrigated crops), hydro-economic models
determine how units of water should be allocated across time,
space, and uses to produce the greatest overall economic net
beneﬁt (Harou et al 2009). Such models have been applied
widely for estimation of tradeoffs across users and sectors
encompassing human consumption and production of goods
and services, recreation, and production of environmental
services and ecological habitat (Jenkins et al 2004, Medellín-
Azuara et al 2007, Harou et al 2009).
The value of using hydro-economic models for assessing
the costs of non-cooperation stems from their ability to
identify an efﬁcient and spatially-differentiated allocation of
water against which non-cooperative management alter-
natives can be compared (Tilmant and Kinzelbach 2012). In
our conceptualization of this problem, the potential gains
from cooperation in a basin can be obtained by comparing the
net economic beneﬁts of water allocations under two distinct
approaches of infrastructure development and water man-
agement. The ﬁrst approach, hereafter referred to as the
‘basin-wide approach,’ assumes that construction and opera-
tion of new and existing control infrastructures and water
allocated to different uses in a basin are coordinated across
space and over time to maximize economic net beneﬁts, and
is generally consistent with the optimization methods imple-
mented using traditional water resources planning models.
This approach represents an upper bound on the economic
production that could be achieved, given physical, legal, or
other constraints (Cai 2008). Such planning models have
previously been applied to the Mekong which encompasses
the Nam Ngum Basin considered in this paper (Ringler
et al 2004, Ringler and Cai 2006).
The second optimization approach, which we call the
‘facility optimizer approach’, disaggregates the model into a
set of facility-speciﬁc economic agents (hydroelectric dams in
our example) who seek to maximize economic net beneﬁts at
their speciﬁc locations given the actions of others located
upstream in the basin (Giuliani and Castelletti 2013). The
problem is then solved sequentially. In stage 1, upstream
dams or water users manage reservoir releases or water
abstractions over the course of a year to optimize their loca-
tion-speciﬁc economic returns without accounting for down-
stream impacts. In stage 2, those located immediately
downstream of the stage 1 users optimize their own behavior
on the basis of the water releases they receive from those
upstream agents. The upstream water releases, obtained in
stage 1 of the optimization routine, are thus treated as exo-
genous inputs to the stage 2 agents’ decision problem. This
process then continues with solution of a series of
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optimization problems until the downstream end of the basin
is reached. It thus represents the least cooperative river basin
case possible, because upstream agents make decisions
entirely independently of downstream demands. Figure 1
provides a conceptual diagram of this modeling framework,
with a very simple node schematic of the infrastructures
included in this analysis (discussed in section 3.1), invest-
ments which are made primarily for hydropower and agri-
cultural production. On the left-hand side, reservoir
operations are coordinated, yielding the basin-wide solution.
The diagram on the right represents the facility optimizer
approach in which dams are independently operated and
different colors represent different stages of the optimization
routine.
Several points should be made about this approach.
First, its main advantage is that it more accurately represents
independently managed dam facilities, and the reality that
downstream water users are often forced to conform to the
timing and quantity of upstream reservoir releases (Ber-
nauer 2002). Comparing the results from these distinct opti-
mization approaches provides a proxy for the net economic
beneﬁts to coordination, which can be assessed against the
potential transaction costs that such management might entail.
Second, the methodology can accommodate a variety of
infrastructure project types (e.g., hydropower dams, irrigation
infrastructures, water transfers) and operating rules, and can
be adapted to consider changes in the management of existing
and/or new potential infrastructures. It produces information
on the economic value of cooperation that could facilitate
negotiations and more efﬁcient use of the resource, as well as
re-consideration of existing regulatory constraints. Third, it
allows examination of the distribution of relative economic
gains and losses across users when moving from a facility-
level to a basin-wide approach. Such information sheds light
on the compensation that might be necessary to encourage
upstream users to adjust their behavior in order to achieve the
optimal basin-wide solution. Yet it must be noted that in
many cases, there may already be partial coordination
between users, or their behavior may otherwise be regulated.
In fact, the facility optimizer approach could be extended to
allow for partial coordination in which individual agents
iteratively establish priorities for collaboration with other
agents until an equilibrium outcome is achieved (Yang
et al 2009, Yang et al 2011). In addition, such partial coor-
dination is already reﬂected in any model that works from a
set of pre-determined infrastructure design parameters, since
decision makers usually consider a variety of impacts from
such projects. Partial coordination can also be accommodated
by collapsing the stages of the facility optimizer approach
according to the realities of a basin’s prevailing water man-
agement regime. Similarly, to the extent that such rules are
known, regulation can be imposed on the system through
Figure 1. Conceptual diagram comparing optimization methods for the basin-wide (cooperative) approach and the multi-stage facility
optimizer (non-cooperative) approach in the Nam Ngum Basin application. Note that downstream agriculture is viewed as an objective of the
Nam Ngum 1 (NN1) facility in this example.
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inclusion of behavioral constraints, for example on minimum
releases or seasonal production targets; this is in fact the
approach we adopt in this paper’s application.
2.2. Existing studies on the costs of non-cooperation
Optimization models have been extensively applied to pro-
blems of reservoir coordination in the literature, mostly for
operations of existing infrastructure (Yeh 1985, Laba-
die 2004, Anghileri et al 2012). For planning purposes, such
models typically also incorporate the economic beneﬁts
associated with optimal management of new potential infra-
structure, most commonly for irrigation or hydropower pro-
duction (Cai et al 2002, Goor et al 2010). The basic objective
of all such models is to identify release decisions that max-
imize output or beneﬁts from system operation over a given
planning period.
Few applications of such models have explored how user-
speciﬁc objectives may deviate from the optimal system-wide
solutions, though several do so indirectly by measuring the
economic value of cooperation relative to some constrained
status quo (Fisher 2005, Whittington et al 2005). One short-
coming in such analyses is that infrastructure or allocations in
the non-cooperative state are generally taken to be ﬁxed or to
follow a speciﬁc trajectory over time, which may not be rea-
listic; in addition, few studies consider unilateral developments
across multiple sectors or the implications of multi-sectoral
objectives.1 Tilmant and Kinzelbach (2012) provide a different
example for the Zambezi that allows for unilateral development
in irrigation or hydropower that stems from different country-
level advantages in these two domains. They estimate that the
cost of non-cooperation may reach $350 million per annum,
equivalent to 10% of the annual beneﬁts derived from the
system. In the same basin, Giuliani and Castelleti (2013) apply
an agent-based approach that considers how coordination and
information-sharing can improve outcomes for downstream
users given existing infrastructure, even if operations are not
fully coordinated. In this case, downstream users can model
upstream riparians’ optimal responses and adapt their own
operations accordingly. Finally, Yang et al (2011) use their
agent-based approach to consider the potential gains from
water trading (compared to no regulation and a speciﬁc reg-
ulation regime) in the Yellow River.
It is worth noting that the cost of non-cooperation (and
conversely the beneﬁt of cooperation) will not in general be
equitably shared across water users and operators of river-
basin infrastructure of different types; Tilmant and Kinzel-
bach (2012) suggest this is a major obstacle toward the efﬁ-
cient sharing of the basin’s water resources. In fact, similar
observations in other basins have motivated game theoretic
analyses that may shed light on the feasibility of coordination
(Rogers 1969). For example, building on the results in
Whittington et al (2005), Wu and Whittington (2006) assess
the incentive compatibility of different coalitions relative to
the non-cooperative status quo with ﬁxed infrastructure.
Though we do not conduct distributional or game theoretic
analyses in this paper, we consider that such analyses would
be useful when combined with information on the economic
gains of coordination.
Building upon previous applications, our study estimates
the beneﬁts to cooperation through a comparison of the
alternative optimization methods presented above. We extend
beyond Giuliani and Castelleti’s (2013) comparison of the
value of information sharing alone by assessing the gains
from cooperative management across scenarios of water
availability. Our approach also differs from that in Tilmant
and Kinzelbach (2012) because we allow for the endogenous
expansion of irrigation and consider the gains from coordi-
nation of ﬂood control.
3. Application to the Nam Ngum basin reservoir
coordination problem
3.1. Description of the application
Our application focuses on the Nam Ngum River Basin in
Lao PDR. Covering 16 800 km2, the Nam Ngum Basin is
home to roughly 500 000 people, representing approximately
9% of Lao PDR’s total population (WREA 2008). It con-
tributes a mean annual ﬂow of 23 km3/year to the Mekong
River, or 4% of the latter’s mean annual ﬂow and up to 15%
of dry season ﬂow (Lacombe et al 2014). The vast majority of
existing food production and expansion potential from the
Nam Ngum is located in the Vientiane Plain, which comprises
the nation’s largest area of agriculturally viable land
(WREA 2008). Several new irrigation projects are in various
stages of planning as part of a larger government strategy to
turn the basin into a national and regional production area for
rice and vegetables. The most ambitious of these proposals
would increase irrigated area by a factor of 5, or 100 000
hectares (Geotech 2012).
Like many rivers in Lao PDR and in the Mekong Basin,
the Nam Ngum attracts the most interest for future develop-
ment because of its hydropower potential (Hirsch 2010). The
basin already includes four dams built primarily for energy
production, three of which were completed in the last ﬁve
years (representing 835MW of installed capacity); all of these
dams are operated independently. Six more are in various
stages of planning (EPD 2012, Lacombe et al 2014). These
developments are seen by many as critically important for
meeting the currently growing energy demand in the lower
Mekong Basin (Yu 2003), but they raise questions and con-
cerns about other potential tradeoffs, for example with water
supply to downstream irrigation, or for ﬂood protection or
ecological ﬂows (Middleton et al 2009). Figure 2 provides a
map of the Nam Ngum Basin that shows the location of
existing and planned dams included in our analysis.
We apply a nonlinear optimization model for assessing
the economic beneﬁts of hydropower generation and water
allocation to irrigated agriculture in the basin. The objective
function of this monthly model maximizes the net returns to
1 Whittington et al (2005) argued that this assumption was appropriate in the
case of the Nile in 2005 because the countries required cooperation to access
sufﬁcient international capital for the large investments being considered.
Since 2005, the situation has however evolved.
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hydropower (monthly revenue less capital costs) and irrigated
agricultural proﬁts over an annual period (and thus assumes
full hydrological foresight over this period). The model
ensures hydrologic continuity (water balance). Also, it
includes constraints that require a storage buffer for ﬂood
control and environmental ﬂow requirements, though the
economic beneﬁts of ﬂood control and ecological protection
are not incorporated into the objective function due to lack of
valuation data relating to these aspects. Other constraints
govern the availability of agricultural land and seasonal
energy demand (Bartlett et al 2012).2 This formulation thus
allows determination of the marginal opportunity costs (or
shadow values) associated with relaxing those constraints
(e.g. relaxing a minimum release constraint). The model
includes spatially-disaggregated irrigable potential across the
basin, as well as all existing and planned dams except for
Nam Leuk and Nam Mang 3, and the run-off-river Nam Lik 1
dam, for which dam-speciﬁc parameters were not available.
Irrigation expansion is a key decision variable; the model thus
chooses how much land should be irrigated, weighing the
costs of canal expansion and cultivation against the beneﬁts of
crop production for newly irrigated land.
We consider the value of coordination based on the basic
approach described previously in section 2.1. Under full
coordination, the model solves for the optimal solution sub-
ject to a basin ﬂood control buffer (we explore a range from 0
to 9% of system storage across sensitivity analyses). This is
reasonable given that ﬂood protection in this basin is most
needed in the ﬂoodplain downstream of the full set of dams;
thus a system buffer would provide reservoir managers
maximum ﬂexibility for storing excess ﬂows during extreme
events. In the absence of coordination, on the other hand, we
assume that the ﬂood control buffer would have to be
Figure 2. The Nam Ngum Basin, including current and planned hydropower dams.
2 An abbreviated summary of the objective function and constraints can be
found in the supplementary materials provided with this paper. A more
complete description of the model can be found in Bartlett et al (2012),
available at: http://sites.nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/environmentaleconomics/
working-paper-series/.
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maintained by the dam furthest downstream in the system
(Nam Ngum 1—NN1).
Southeast Asia and the Mekong region are frequently
cited as highly vulnerable to climate change (Samson
et al 2011, Watson et al 2013). In order to understand how the
beneﬁts of coordination vary with hydrological conditions,
we model dry, normal, and wet years as selected from the
range of available historical ﬂows covering the period
1967–2004. The ﬂow difference across dry (minimum ﬂow
into the Mekong) and wet (maximum) ﬂows in this time
series encompasses the range of projections for climate
change over the Nam Ngum (Lacombe et al 2014). Still, to
further examine the potential interaction of more extreme
climate conditions with low and high ﬂow variability, and
based on the lack of agreement over potential changes
described in the literature (WREA 2008, Kingston et al 2011,
Lauri et al 2012, Thompson et al 2013), we also consider the
sensitivity of our results (for each of these three years) to
uniform and basin-wide inﬂow changes ranging from −20%
to +20%.3 As the Nam Ngum is an important tributary to the
Mekong in terms of dry season ﬂow, the scenarios presented
here allow us to consider how ﬂows into the larger river
would be affected by these collective developments, with and
without cooperation, across a range of potential future climate
conditions.
3.2. Results
There are important declines in overall economic returns
when dams are independently managed compared to the
basin-wide optimal solution (table 1). While the literature
supports the idea that coordination should improve economic
outcomes, the comparison of results from these alternative
modeling approaches provides a more straightforward esti-
mate of the cost of uncoordinated management. Intuitively,
overall economic net beneﬁts increase with water availability
and inﬂow (ﬁgure 3); somewhat surprisingly the costs of
uncoordinated operation do as well. When water is limited in
the basin, upstream dams have less ﬂexibility to make dry
season adjustments to operating rules, which decreases eco-
nomic returns at downstream locations. As water availability
increases and upstream dams are able to adjust dry season
operations, we ﬁnd increased gains from coordination with
downstream dams. Variability plays a role as well; since the
average year has the most variable ﬂows across months, the
gains from coordination are greater than for the wet year
which has more consistent (high) ﬂows.4
Perhaps because there is no shortage of water required to
meet the irrigable potential in the Nam Ngum (Lacombe
et al 2014), we ﬁnd that the difference in economic beneﬁts is
driven entirely by a shift in hydropower output (there is no
change in net irrigation proﬁts) (table 2). In addition, for the
dams located in the upstream part of the basin (Nam Ngum 5
—NN5, Nam Ngum 4—NN4, Nam Lik 1—NL1 and Nam
Bak 2—NB2), there is little net change in annual hydropower
Table 1. Economic beneﬁts with and without coordination across hydrological conditions (million US$/yr).
Dry year Average year Wet year
Basin-wide optimization (cooperative solution) 358 508 537
Facility-speciﬁc optimization (non-cooperative solution) 346 478 515
Gain in beneﬁts with cooperation 12 30 23
Per cent difference with non-cooperation −3.4% −6.3% −4.4%
Notes: assumes a ﬂood control buffer equivalent to 6% of storage capacity; row 3 is computed as row 1−row 2,
with apparent inconsistencies due to rounding.
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Figure 3. Sensitivity of economic net beneﬁts to changes in ﬂows
(with ﬂood control buffer equivalent to 6% of storage).
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Figure 4. Sensitivity of coordination beneﬁts to ﬂood control
requirements.
3 We would argue that this sensitivity approach is appropriate because our
focus is not on the use of climate change projections for hydrological
analysis, and because of the lack of consensus on impacts over this region.
4 The hydrographs depicting optimized streamﬂow at the conﬂuence with
the Mekong in each of these hydrologic years are provided in the
supplementary materials.
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generation between the cooperative and non-cooperative
solution (less than 2% for most cases). Instead, the difference
in outcomes is driven by decreased hydropower generation at
the larger dams (Nam Ngum 2—NN2 and NN1) located in
the downstream part of the system. This is due to both
adjustments in the timing of releases from upstream dams and
shifting management of releases from NN1 in response to
ﬂood control requirements. Although total hydropower does
not change substantially for NN4, NN5, NL1, and NB2 over
the full year, there are large seasonal adjustments in produc-
tion (table 2; seasonal results shown for average water
availability). Under the facility-speciﬁc approach, upstream
dams reduce dry season turbine releases in an effort to
maintain high head such that hydropower production—a
multiplicative function of head and outﬂow—remains high
during the subsequent wet season. This reduction in turbine
releases has a cascading effect downstream, as inﬂows to
larger downstream dams decline in the dry season. Addi-
tionally, individual dams are forced to hit seasonal energy
demand targets in this case, whereas the cooperative solution
manages all dams simultaneously to conform to demand
schedules.
These inefﬁciencies are further exacerbated when ﬂood
control requirements increase and cannot be coordinated across
dams (ﬁgure 4). In the absence of any ﬂood control requirement,
the gains from coordination range from about 0–4% across
hydrological years, mostly driven by the effects described above.
As ﬂood control requirements rise to 9% of storage, the gains
from coordination rise to 4–12% (and are lower under dry and
less variable hydrologic ﬂows). Coordinated management of
ﬂood control allows the system to maintain the ﬂood buffer
where the marginal cost of lower storage (in terms of lost
hydropower) is smallest, a cost that varies across dams.
Finally, changes in release patterns from upstream dams
reduce outﬂow and dry season water availability in the non-
cooperative case, which increases evaporation at upstream
dams. The combined impact of reduced dry season outﬂows
and increased evaporation at upstream dams lowers total
basin outﬂows into the Mekong River over the course of the
simulation year for the average and wet hydrologic scenarios
(ﬁgure 5).
For each of the dry, average and wet years, total basin
outﬂows increase substantially in the dry season as NN1
increases turbine releases in the early months of the simula-
tion to hit the total basin ﬂood control target (ﬁgure 5). Wet
season outﬂows then decrease for the uncoordinated cases as
lower storage is maintained in NN1 with the ﬂood control
requirement (hence, an effort is made to maintain head
through reduced outﬂows). The combined effects of altered
dam operations, shifts in dry/wet season outﬂows, and
increased evapotranspiration are important when considering
the many Mekong River tributaries with similar hydropower
development ambitions, and the collective inﬂuence that such
developments could have on Mekong River ﬂows. For
instance, Lao PDR currently has more than ten dams in
operation, eight under construction, and 82 under license or in
planning stages nationwide, together representing more than
20 000MW (ICEM 2010). The broader literature is contra-
dictory about the extent to which large-scale development of
dams in tributaries of the Mekong could adversely affect
ecosystem services (Lu and Siew 2006, Dugan et al 2010, Ziv
et al 2012); any such negative effects, however, would seem
to be exacerbated in the case of facility-centered management
which would not account for such downstream objectives.
4. Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we argue that hydro-economic models can be
used to provide valuable insights into the cost of non-coop-
eration in water resources systems. This basic argument is not
new, but has not been clearly articulated in the literature with
empirical evidence. The conceptual framework we propose
for this comparison considers the difference in outcomes
achieved by basin-wide optimization versus those produced
by facility-speciﬁc optimization. This comparative approach
shows how water use beneﬁts differ between speciﬁc indi-
vidual users endowed with locational or other advantages and
the basin as a whole. In the Nam Ngum basin, we ﬁnd that the
potential gains from coordination of infrastructure manage-
ment reach 3–12% (US$12–53 million/yr) of system beneﬁts
with modest (6–9% reserve storage) ﬂood control, an estimate
that would be expected to increase if the beneﬁts of coordi-
nated selection and sizing of projects, rather than simple
management, were included.
To many, these estimates of the value of improved
coordination in the Nam Ngum Basin may appear modest. As
such, the considerable effort required to derive them might
hardly seem worth expending, especially given the likely
challenges and costs of implementing institutional arrange-
ments that would deliver them. We would counter such
arguments with two points. First, the 10% increase in net
beneﬁts from coordinated management of operations in one
particular river system within a single country should not be
viewed in isolation. Development of institutions that would
enable the capture of these beneﬁts would very likely also
deliver beneﬁts from other systems within and shared by the
same country. Second, and more importantly, little is cur-
rently known about the extent to which these ﬁndings from
Figure 5. Per cent change in total Nam Ngum Basin outﬂows into the
Mekong (facility-speciﬁc solution relative to basin-wide cooperative
solution, with 6% ﬂood storage buffer).
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the Nam Ngum generalize to other basins, and it would be
unwise to draw conclusions on the magnitude of losses from
sub-optimal management based on this single case. At the
same time, multilateral donors and governments have been
expending considerable efforts and money to encourage
greater negotiation over water resources (Alaerts 1999). It
would therefore seem worthwhile for the global community to
develop a more systematic understanding of the circum-
stances under which lack of coordination is particularly
costly, using a coherent framework. To develop this under-
standing, more applications and comparative studies are
needed, in large and small basins facing a variety of different
types of water resource management problems. Collective
action and political economy theories suggest a variety of
factors—for example the number of agents, clarity of the
existing property rights, degree of spatial and temporal
variability and change in the resource, and magnitude and
directionality of externalities—that are related to sub-optimal
resource management (Ostrom et al 1999). The framework
for testing these theories in the context of water resources
should also be extended to consider the broader (and likely
more substantial) costs of non-cooperation, including for
example delayed or stalled resource development (Wu
et al 2013), or sub-optimal choice of infrastructure (Jeuland
and Whittington 2014).
Though a detailed review of the limitations of the hydro-
economic framework is beyond the scope of this article and
can be found elsewhere, we also wish to highlight several
important practical problems with their use for assessment of
the true costs of non-cooperation, which are also relevant to
our model application. First, and not unique to hydro-eco-
nomic modeling, is the valuation challenge in such an exer-
cise. Errors in accounting for the diversity of potential
impacts of different management regimes—particularly non-
market ones that are hard to measure and characterize (Jager
and Smith 2008, Dasgupta 2013)—may bias estimates of the
potential gains from cooperation. Relatively few studies
(Ward et al 2006 and Tilmant et al 2010 are notable exam-
ples) incorporate environmental or recreational beneﬁts into
model objectives. Indeed, in the example presented here,
ecosystem and ﬂood control objectives were only included as
minimum ﬂow constraints. Including a more complete set of
downstream impacts and objectives, for example an ecosys-
tem beneﬁt function as a function of ﬂow, could alter the
nature of the solution and the economic tradeoffs across
coordination scenarios, should the required data become
available. Even more generally, prices for water typically do
not reﬂect the marginal value of water, such that econometric,
survey, or indirect methods are required to estimate the
demand (or marginal beneﬁt curve) for water (Gibbons 1986,
Arbués et al 2003, Freeman 2003, Jenkins et al 2003,
Young 2005). The problem becomes even more complex
given debates over whether valuation of the beneﬁts from
water is even appropriate (Sagoff 1988, Shabman and Ste-
phenson 2000, Smajgl et al 2010).
A second objection arises from the potential lack of
realism in the speciﬁcation of economic beneﬁts achievable
with and without cooperation, for example due to model
misspeciﬁcation. Our use of a monthly time step in this
application ignores the complications associated with man-
agement of short-term releases and their potential effects on
agriculture (e.g., short-term ﬂood pulse or drought intensiﬁ-
cation due to release rules aimed at maximizing hydropower).
In addition, managers in reality possess imperfect information
about future hydrology or human adaptation, and coordina-
tion may entail signiﬁcant transaction costs. Optimization
models including stochastic optimization are useful for
determining what is best under perfect information or boun-
ded uncertainty, but the complexity of water resource systems
means that uncertainty is typically great (Loucks et al 1981,
Sahinidis 2004). As a result, systems modelers and infra-
structure operators may prefer to base decisions on the use of
simulation tools that better allow exploration of performance
across a range of conditions (Jeuland and Whittington 2014).
Third, when considering systems that are composed of
many facility-speciﬁc optimizing agents, it may not be
appropriate to set river management policy based on optimal
expected values as was done here, because the beneﬁciaries of
water-related services are typically risk averse and may be
especially worried about water-related outcomes at particular
locations in a river basin or about correlated risks across time
and space (Philbrick and Kitanidis 1999, Grifﬁn 2006).
Uncertainty over future beneﬁts and costs further implies that
decision rules based on avoiding downside risk may be more
Table 2. Per cent difference in hydropower generation by dam under varying precipitation conditions, relative to full coordination.
Average year
Dry year Wet year Dry season Wet season Annual
Nam Bak 1 −0.4% 0.0% −4.0% 3.0% −0.4%
Nam Bak 2 1.2% 0.0% −9.0% 13.0% 1.0%
Nam Leuk 1–2 1.1% 1.4% 9.0% −4.0% 1.0%
Nam Ngum 1 −26.0% −15.0% −3.0% −31.0% −20.0%
Nam Ngum 2 −0.1% −9.3% −6.0% −11.0% −9.0%
Nam Ngum 3 −1.7% −2.8% −9.0% −8.0% −9.0%
Nam Ngum 4 1.1% −0.1% −13.0% 14.0% 0.0%
Nam Ngum 5 −0.3% 4.5% −8.0% 8.0% −0.1%
All dams −5.0% −5.4% −6.0% −9.0% −8.0%
Notes: seasonal differences shown for average year only; all results assume a ﬂood control
buffer equivalent to 6% of storage capacity.
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relevant (Jeuland and Whittington 2014) or that dynamic
uncertainty should be modeled more explicitly (Con-
nor 2008). Finally, users and nations typically behave as if
water is much more valuable—perhaps for security reasons—
than economic calculations would suggest (Whittington
et al 2013). To be sure, hydro-economic models can be
modiﬁed to accommodate these different priorities (Harou
et al 2009).
In spite of these important limitations, we believe that
additional comparisons such as those provided in this paper
would be useful for informing efforts to improve cooperation
over water resources.
They offer tangible estimates of the potential gains from
coordination, which can be assessed under average or
potentially extreme climate conditions. Information on the
nature of such cooperative gains can help parties negotiate
more favorable water resource outcomes, and discuss issues
of compensation for those who may not receive beneﬁts from
cooperation. Such information will also become increasingly
valuable as climate change increases uncertainty in river
basins across the globe.
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